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The British Dominions and
Foreign Relations*
HERBERT A. SMITHt

If there is any truth at all in the common statement that the
British Constitution is "unwritten" it is a truth which needs somewhat careful explanation. In point of fact, practically the whole
operation of government, both in the mother country and abroad, is
at the present time carried on under express statutory powers. In a
few instances, of which the most important is the conduct of foreign
affairs, executive action is based upon the ancient common law prerogative of the Crown, but in all cases, whatever is done, is done in
virtue of some definite law capable of ascertainment in the courts.
To define the exact legal powers of any organ of government is
seldom more difficult, and is usually much easier, in the British
Empire than under the highly intricate federal system of the United
States.
The assertion that the British Constitution is "unwritten" can
only be true in one of two senses. In the first place, the text of our
statutory constitutional law is scattered over a large number of
statutes instead of being comprised in a single instrument, specially
designated as "The Constitution" and protected from easy alteration
by an elaborate procedure reserved for, that single purpose. But
this difference is really only a difference in the form which the writing
takes. The law is equally written law in either case. The real
element of truth in the popular statement lies in the fact that the
actual practice of government under the British system is largely
governed by well understood conventions, which enable a modern
political democracy to express its will and act upon its will through
legal forms that are inherited from the practice of the ancient monarchy. To a large extent this conventional element is necessarily
*This article contains the substance of a lecture delivered at Cornell University on March 12th, 1926.
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present in the operation of all modern governments. In the United
States a conspicuous example is to be found in the growth of the
political practice which has reduced the original Electoral College to a
ceremonial form and made the actual choice of a President depend
upon the direct vote of the people. As compared with the American
Constitution, the British is "unwritten" in the sense that this conventional element controls the practice of our government to a much
larger extent than it does in the United States.
The law itself is always supreme, and no political convention can
ever contravene the letter of the law. For this reason the area within
which such conventions can be effective is always strictly limited.
Great changes have taken place in the character of government in
England by a process of purely political development, but no development of conventional practice could (for example) enable the executive to dismiss the judges at will or deprive Parliament of its control
over public finance. Practice must always move within the limits
laid down for it by law, and an accurate knowledge of the law is
essential if we are to understand the practice.
At this point the reader may be tempted to ask what bearing these
generalities have upon the subject matter of the present article.
Two points should be emphasized in answer. In the first place, there
has taken place within living memory, and particularly within the
last ten years, a very important change in the conduct of its foreign
affairs by the British Empire, and this change has up to the present
been accomplished without changing a letter of the law governing
the matter. Secondly, this development has now, in my opinion,
practically reached the extreme limits possible within the structure of
our present constitution. If any further developments are contemplated, except in matters of detail, they will involve fundamental
changes in the law which preserves the integrity of the Empire as an
international unit.
The executive conduct of foreign affairs under the British Constitution depends upon the principle that it belongs to the prerogative of the Crown to direct and define the relations of Great Britain
with all foreign states. Historically this legal rule is a survival of
the mediaeval theory which regarded all international relations as
being in the nature of personal intercourse between the sovereigns
concerned. A treaty was not made between England and France,
but between the King of England and the King of France. Upon this
principle the Crown alone can determine whether, for example,
Great Britain is at peace or war with any particular foreign state,
and the statement of the Crown upon such a point is conclusively
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binding upon all courts of law. Similarly all diplomatic intercourse
with other nations, whether permanent or occasional, is conducted
by the Crown through plenipotentiaries of its own choice, and no
treaty made with Great Britain becomes an obligation binding in
international law until it is ratified by the ICing's signature, and sealed
with the Great Seal. This ratification does not in law require the concurrence of Parliament or of either of the two houses.
The tremendous power thus vested by law in the hands of the
Crown is qualified by two other legal rules which in effect compel the
Crown to conduct foreign affairs in accordance with the will of Parliament. In the first place the rule that no public money can be
either raised or spent except under the authority of an Act of Parliament renders it obviously impossible for the Crown to embark upon
any war for which it cannot be sure of obtaining Parliamentary
sanction. -Secondly no treaty made by the Crown can operate to
affect the existing legal rights of British subjects under the ordinary
law unless and until the necessary statutory changes are made by
legislation passed through Parliament in the usual way. A good
example of this rule is to be found in the case of Walker v. Baird,I
decided by the Privy Council upon an appeal from Newfoundland.
In that case a treaty had been made between Great Britain and
France concerning the special privileges to be granted to French
fishermen upon the Newfoundland coast. Certain Newfoundlanders
had erected buildings upon the shore which violated the terms of the
treaty, and Captain Walker destroyed these buildings in discharge of
his duties as senior naval officer upon the station. At the time no
legislation had been enacted to implement the international obligation, and the Privy Council held that the existence of the treaty
could not by itself serve to justify an act which, apart from the treaty,
would undoubtedly have been a tort. Since few treaties of major
importance can be concluded which do not at some point affect the
legal rights of individuals it follows that in effect the law, and not
only the political practice, compels the Crown to conduct foreign
affairs in close co-operation with Parliament.
The next point to notice is that in this matter of the conduct of
foreign relations the royal prerogative is not delegated to the Governors of the Dominions and Colonies. To a large extent the colonial
Governor is a viceroy clothed with the attributes of his sovereign.
For example, he gives the royal assent to all legislative acts within
his jurisdiction, and he is usually empowered to exercise the prerogative of pardon. He convenes and dissolves the legislature, and in all
'[1892] A. C. 491.
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ordinary matters of executive government he acts as if he were the
King himself, and is under no obligation to take instructions from
London. But no colonial Governor ever enjoys the full measure
of the royal prerogative, and in particular he is never invested with
any of the attributes of a sovereign in international law. In relation
to the people of his own Dominion he is for most practical purposes
equivalent to a King. In the eyes of foreign nations he is not allowed
to be anything more than a local official of high rank. He can neither
commission diplomatic plenipotentiaries himself nor receive the
envoys of other powers. It is scarcely necessary to add that he cannot ratify treaties, declare peace or war, or define in any way the
relations of his Dominion to foreign states.
From this it follows that when Dominion statesmen take part as
plenipotentiaries in international discussions they must obtain
their formal credentials from the Crown in Great Britain, and not
from the particular Dominion which in fact they represent. The
form of these documents makes it amply clear that the plenipotentiary represents the person of his Sovereign, who undertakes in person
to honour all agreements concluded in his name. The parties to the
contemplated treaty are invariably described as being the King and
the foreign ruler (or republic), and there is not a word in the text
of the document to indicate that the bearer represents any particular
part of the Empire more than another.
The present law of the British Constitution therefore guarantees
to the cabinet in London an effective control over the whole diplomacy of the Empire, in so far as it is conducted through the regular
diplomatic channels. In so far as the various Dominion cabinets are
able to take a share in this diplomacy they do so by the invitation of
the central power and within any limits which it may see fit to lay
down. Under the political practice of Great Britain the King can
only act in affairs of state upon the advice of his responsible ministers,
who are in their turn collectively responsible to the House of Commons and to the country at large. Since it is obviously impossible
that the King should accept advice from several distinct ministries in
different parts of the Empire, it follows that the exercise of any
prerogative not delegated to colonial Governors must in effect be
directed by the cabinet of Great Britain. No other cabinet enjoys
the right of direct access to the throne. The executive ministry of
Canada can deal directly with their own Governor-General, but they
can only approach tile King through the medium of the Secretary of
State for the Dominions.
The law then is perfectly clear. At the same time, following
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the traditions of our Constitution, it has been found possible within
the limits of the law to establish a practice of inviting the greater
Dominions to take as much part in the conduct of foreign affairs as
the circumstances of each particular case permit. I will not attempt
in the space available to trace the various stages of this development,
most of which has taken place within recent memory, but some of the
more outstanding features may be briefly summarized. In particular
we should note :(i)-The participation by Dominion plenipotentiaries in the negotiation and signature of the peace treaties of r9ig and the Washington treaties of X922.
(2)-The withholding of the King's ratification of these treaties
until the approval of the Dominion Parliaments had been obtained.
( 3 )-The negotiation and signature by a single Canadian representative of the "Halibut Treaty" of 1923 between Great Britain and
the United States.
(4)-The admission of the Dominions to separate voting membership in the Assembly of the League of Nations.
(5)-The appointment by the Crown of resident Irish and Canadian ministers to conduct Irish and Canadian business at Washington.
(6)-The resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 19232.
So far we have been dealing with what may be called formal
diplomacy-the appointment of fully accredited plenipotentiaries
and the negotiation of formal treaties which are strictly binding in
international law. To complete the picture it should be added that a
considerable amount of international business is conducted in a less
formal manner, and that this kind of business can be freely transacted by the Dominions with little or no opportunity for Imperial
interference or control. A good example may be found in the tariff
agreement concluded between Canada and Germany in i9io. In
this case the negotiating representatives were Mr. Fielding, then
Canadian Minister of Finance, and the German Consul-General in
Montreal. Effect was given to the terms of the agreement by a Canadian Order in Council and by corresponding executive action in
Germany.
It will be observed that an agreement of this kind differs both in
form and in legal effect from a treaty proper. The negotiators were
not provided with the diplomatic commissions technically known as
"full powers," and therefore they had no authority to bind their
respective sovereigns. No ratifications were exchanged, and there2

The text of these resolutions will be found at the end of this article.
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fore no international obligation was created. A failure to observe the
terms of the agreement would not have been a wrong in the eyes of
international law, and would have given no occasion for any remonstrance through the usual diplomatic channels. The negotiators
acted as representing their official superiors, and in law there was
nothing more than a personal undertaking on the part of the executive
officials concerned that a certain policy would be carried into effect.
The reciprocity agreement which Sir Wilfrid Laurier negotiated with
certain American ministers at Washington in igII was of the same
kind. In this case Sir Wilfrid was defeated at the ensuing general
election, and the Conservative government which succeeded him was
under no obligation to follow his policy in relation to the tariff.
Had the agreement been a treaty it would of course have been binding upon Canada irrespective of any change in her internal government.
In practice a large amount of international business, particularly
with the United States, is transacted by Canada in this informal
manner. The paths of ceremonial diplomacy are apt to be circuitous
and congested, and results in cases of minor importance are more
quickly reached by direct correspondence between the executive
officials concerned. One consequence of the practice has been to
give a quasi-diplomatic status to the consuls-general of the chief
European powers in Ottawa and Montreal. These officers carry no
diplomatic credentials, since there is no sovereign power in Canada
to whom they could be accredited, but in practice much of the business which passes through their hands is diplomatic rather than consular in character.
The practical conveniences of this informal procedure are quite
sufficient to justify its employment, so long as its limitations are
clearly recognized. But any attempt to disregard these limitations
and employ informal methods for the conduct of business involving
major issues of policy would undoubtedly lead to very serious difficulties.
So far we have been engaged in studying examples of the part
taken by the Dominions in international affairs, whether independently or in co-operation with the mother country. But there- is
another side to the picture, and it now becomes necessary to examine
the instances in which the Dominions have been excluded from taking
any part in the negotiation and settlement of diplomatic questions.
Out of many instances it will be sufficient to select two-the negotiations which preceded the outbreak of war in 1914 and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
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The recently published memoirs of Viscount Grey and Mr. Page, as
well as a host of other books, enable us to form a vivid picture of
what went on in London during the ten days immediately preceding
the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany. Without
going into any of the controversies that have arisen it is clear that
the Foreign Secretary was bearing a physical and mental strain
which almost reached the limits of human endurance. All through the
day and a large part of the night he was in almost hourly telegraphic
correspondence with the British ambassadors in at least six foreign
capitals, and he was continually being called upon to receive the
ambassadors of the same and other powers in London. None of this
work could be delegated. Decisions of the most tremendous importance had to be taken by Sir Edward Grey himself, and foreign
ambassadors could not be asked to state their views to subordinate
officials. Furthermore he had to keep in the closest touch with
the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the House of Commons, and
unanimity in the Cabinet was not reached until the German armies
violated the frontier of Belgium.
It is obvious that in circumstances such as these any attempt to
work in consultation with the Dominions would have been an absolute physical impossibility. The High Commissioners who represent
the Dominions in London have no diplomatic status, and are not
authorised to express the views of their respective governments upon
questions of foreign policy. Consultation could only have been by
cable, and it was manifestly impossible to deal in this way with a
situation which was changing almost from hour to hour. The
French or German Ambassador could walk into Sir Edward Grey's
room and say :- "These are the views of my government; what are
your's?" Clearly it was impossible to reply:--"I should very much
like to be able to tell you the British view, but I cannot do so until I
have consulted the Prime MNinisters of Canada, Australia, South
Africa, and New Zealand." To attempt consultation at such a time
would have been to work with his right hand tied behind his back.
The moral of this is obvious. In times of international crisis,
when vital decisions must be quickly taken, it is necessary for Great
Britain to act alone. The resolutions of the Imperial Conference of
r923 cannot be interpreted to cover such a case. Indeed the attempt
to devise any formula would be idle, since the impossibility of consultative action is not legal, but physical.
Of course the Dominions cannot be co-erced into following the
action of the mother country, nor would any attempt at co-ercion ever
be made. At the same time they are faced with the choice between
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two alternatives. Either they must accept the decision of Great
Britain or they must be prepared to undertake the responsibilities of
independence. In 1914 the response to the needs of the mother
country was immediate, eager, and entirely spontaneous. If a case
should occur in which there was more difference of opinion, it would
still be possible for the Dominions to accept the British decision, and
thereby preserve the unity of the Empire, without committing themselves to take an active part in the war. This measure of independence is fully recognized, and finds formal expression in the Constitution of the Irish Free State, as well as in the recent Treaty of
Locarno. But the refusal to take an active part in the war does not
mean that it is possible for a Dominion to be neutral. Neutrality is an
attribute of international personality, and is not compatible with
any status save that of formal independence. The internal arrangements of the British Empire are not binding upon the enemy, who is
entitled to regard it as a unit unless and until some portion is willing
to assume the responsibility of independence. It therefore follows
that, even if Canada should refuse to take an active part in any
particular war, Canadian shipping would still be liable to attack
and Canadian citizens in enemy countries would still be liable to be
treated as alien enemies.
Let us now turn to consider the case of the Treaty of Lausanne.
It will be remembered that Dominion representatives were invited to
take part in the negotiation of the peace treaties of i919 and the
group of treaties concluded at Washington in 1922. Furthermore
the ratification of these treaties by the King was withheld until the
approval of the Dominion Parliaments had been obtained. Why
were these precedents not followed at Lausanne?
Again the answer is to be found in the comparative urgency of the
issues to be decided. At Paris in i919 there was no real urgency.
The five treaties then concluded are known as the peace treaties, but
the expression is somewhat misleading. The real peace was made
when the order to cease fire was given on the iith November, 1918.
After that date the enemy was disarmed, his country was occupied,
and peace existed in fact. No further resistance was possible and
Germany had no option save to accept whatever terms the Allies
might choose to dictate. The negotiations which took place at
Paris were not really disqussions between the Allies and Germany,
but internal discussions between the Allies themselves. The real
purpose of the five treaties was not to end the Great War; its true
object was to settle all the outstanding controversies of Europe in
such a manner as to prevent new wars.
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The powers which met at Lausanne in the late autumn of 1922
were faced with an entirely different state of affairs. The overthrow
of the puppet Turkish government which had signed the Treaty of
S~vres had in effect relegated that instrument to the waste-paper
basket. Upon the ruins of the old Turkey the genius of Mustapha
Kemal Pasha had built a new and living nation whose capital at
Angora could not be over-awed by the guns of the Allied fleets.
In the swift campaign of 1922 he had driven the Greeks almost from
the gates of his capital into the sea. All Asia Minor north of Syria
acknowledged his rule, and his armies stood on the shores of the
Dardanelles ready to sweep past the small British and French forces
into Europe itself.
In substance the situation at Paris had been reversed. Instead of
being in a position to dictate the terms of peace to a defeated and
disarmed enemy the Allies were now confronted with a victorious
enemy who was ready and willing, if necessary, to continue the war.
In neither Great Britain nor France would public opinion have
permitted a fresh war with Turkey. The conclusion of a permanent
peace was therefore a matter of the first urgency.
In these circumstances it was clearly impossible to invite to
Lausanne any representatives save those of the powers directly concerned, and even these were more numerous than was desirable.
To have invited Dominion representatives to take part in the negotiations would have been either a superfluity or a waste of precious
time. If Dominion statesmen went to Lausanne merely to express
their agreement with the British plenipotentiaries their presence was
clearly superfluous. If they went to advocate some different policy
they would merely have added fresh complications to an already
difficult negotiation, and in the end it would have been necessary for
Great Britain to insist that her view should prevail. From that
dilemma there was no escape.
The same dilemma arises in all cases where the diplomacy of
Great Britain deals with those major issues of policy which determine
the status of nations or the existence of peace or war. In all these
cases the Dominions must inevitably face the alternatives of either
accepting the decision of Great Britain or severing the imperial link,
During the period of negotiation it is agreed that they are entitled to
the fullest information at the command of the Foreign Office and to
the fullest opportunity of making their influence felt in the counsels of
the home government. But at the end there can only be one decision, and that decision must rest with the British cabinet.
In passing we may observe that the recent innovation of establish-

Io
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ing Irish and Canadian legations at Washington does not in any way
affect the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. There is
nothing to prevent the Crown from being represented by three or
more plenipotentiaries instead of by one, and the new ministers,
like the British Ambassadors, carry credentials under the King's
hand and the Great Seal of the United Kingdom. In all matters of
major policy the three must act as one, and the power retained by
the London cabinet of recalling any envoy gives it a perfectly effective
means of control. The new practice involves no change either in
constitutional or in international law. It amounts to nothing more
than an administrative arrangement for the more convenient dispatch of certain classes of business.
At this point perhaps it may be possible to summarize briefly
what has been said. The whole business of international relations
and diplomacy may be roughly divided into two main classes. On
the one hand we have the.business which does not directly involve
questions of high policy. In part this consists of what may be called
routine business, that is to say, the settlement of the numerous
questions that arise out of the contacts of different executive governments in the discharge of their ordinary duties. In part it may
involve matters of very substantial importance, such as the adjustment of tariffs or the negotiation of international agreements upon
such questions as maritime law. In each case it has proved possible
to concede to the Dominions a substantial autonomy in dealing with
this class of business without violating in any degree the principle of
imperial unity. Even where the question involved necessitates the
conclusion of formal treaties negotiated at international conferences
the modern practice is to give the Dominions full opportunity for
participation and to insert clauses in the treaty preserving to the
Dominions the right of separate adhesion or withdrawal. 3
On the other hand we have what may be called the major diplomacy, which decides the issues of peace or war and discusses all those
great questions upon which the status or the existence of nations
may depend. As the situation at present stands, the decision of these
questions rests in the last resort with the British government alone.
At the same time it is recognized on all sides that the Foreign Office is
under a moral obligation to furnish the Dominion governments with
all the information at its command, however confidential, and to invite them to such consultation and conference as the circumstances of
3
1n such cases it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the obligation
and the applicationof any particular treaty. The treaty becomes binding upon
the whole Empire, but may only apply to a particular portion.
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each particular case may admit. No formula can be found to cover
all possible contingencies. In some cases, such as the war crisis of
1914, effective consultation may be a physical impossibility. Or
again it may happen, as in the case of the Lausanne conference, 4that
. 4The following is the text of the resolutions agreed upon at the Imperial Conference of 1923:"The Conference recommends for the acceptance of the governments of the
Empire represented that the following procedure should be observed in the
negotiation, signature, and ratification of international agreements.
The word 'treaty' is used in the sense of an agreement which, in accordance
with the normal practice of diplomacy, would take the form of a treaty between
Heads of States signed by plenipotentiaries provided with Full Powers issued by
the Heads of the States and authorizing the holders to conclude a treaty.
i.

Negotiation.

I.

(a) It is desirable that no treaty should be negotiated by any of the governments; of the Empire without due consideration of its possible effect on other
parts of the Empire or, if circumstances so demand, on the Empire as a whole.
(b) Before negotiations are opened with the intention of concluding a treaty,
steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other governments of the Empire
likely to be interested are informed, so that, if any such government considers
that its interests would be affected, it may have an opportunity of expressing its
views or, when its interests are intimately involved, of participating in the
negotiations.
(c) In all cases where more than one of the governments of the Empire
participates in the negotiations, there should be the fullest possible exchange of
views between those governments before and during the negotiations. In the
case of treaties negotiated at Interntaional Conferences, where there is a British
Empire Delegation, on which, in accordance with the now established practice,
the Dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should
also be utilized to attain this object.
(d) Steps should be taken to ensure that those governments of the Empire
whose representatives are not participating in the negotiaiions should, during their
progress, be kept informed in regard to any points arising in which they may be
interested.
2. Signature.
(a) Bi-lateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire only
should be signed by a representative of thd government of that part. The Full
Power issued to such representative should indicate the part of the Empire in
respect of which the obligations are to be undertaken, and the preamble and text
of the treaty should be so worded as to make its scope clear.
(b) Where a bi-lateral treaty imposes obligations on more than one part of
the Empire, the treaty should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on
behalf of all the governments concerned.
(c) As regards treaties negotiated at International Conferences, the existing

practice of signature by plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the governments of the
Empire represented at the Conference should be continued, and the Full Powers

should be in the form employed at Paris and Washington.

3. Ratification.
The existing practice in connection with the ratification of treaties should be
maintained.
II.
Apart from treaties made between Heads of States, it is not unusual for agreements to be made between governments. Such agreements, which are usually
of a technical or administrative character, are made in the names of the signatory
governments, and signed by representatives of those governments, who do not
act under Full Powers issued by the Heads of the States: they are not ratified
by the Heads of the States, though in some cases some form of acceptance or
confirmation by the governments concerned is employed. As regards agreements
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the interests of the Dominions are only very slightly involved, and
their admission to the council table would only serve to complicate a
difficult negotiation without producing any corresponding advantages.
Every case must be dealt with on its own merits. Whatever may be
the procedure adopted it is clear that in the last resort the decision of
the London cabinet must prevail, and its decision must be accepted
by the Dominions unless they are prepared to sever the imperial
connection and assume the responsibilities of independent states.
Without violating the unity of the Empire they are at liberty to refuse active assistance in any war, and furthermore they cannot in
practice be compelled to pass the legislation which may in any particular case be necessary to implement the obligations of a treaty.
That is the maximum of liberty which, when the great issues of
foreign policy are concerned, is compatible with the continuance of
the British Empire as a single sovereign unit in the eyes of international law. Beyond that limit a claim for autonomy would amount
in substance to a demand for independence. At present there is no
likelihood that any body of responsible opinion in any part of the Empire will acquire sufficient strength to put forward such a demand as
part of the considered policy of any of the self-governing Dominions.
of this nature the existing practice should be continued, but before entering on
negotiations the governments of the Empire should consider whether the interests
of any other part of the Empire may be affected, and if so, steps should be taken
to ensure that the government of such part is informed of the proposed negotiations, in order that it may have an opportunity of expressing its views."
The Resolution was submitted to the full Conference and unanimously approved. It was thought, however, that it would be of assistance to add a short
explanatory statement in connexion with part I (3), setting out the existing procedure in relation to the ratification of Treaties. This pr6eedure is as follows:
(a) The ratification of treaties imposing obligations on one part of the
Empre is effected at the instance of the Government of that part.
(b) The ratification of treaties imposing obligations on more than one part
of the Empire is effected after consultation between the Governments of those
parts of the Empire concerned. It is for each Government to decide whether
Parliamentary approval or legislation is required before desire for, or concurrence in, ratification is intimated by that Government.
The report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference of 1926 was not issued until the present article was in proof. The proposals
outlined in 1923 are worked out in greater detail, but the report contains nothing
inconsistent with the arguments which I have advanced, and there is an explicit
admission of the fact that the control of all major diplomacy must continue to
be vested in the British Cabinet.

